We show how to construct a variety of "trapdoor" cryptographic tools assuming the worst-case hardness of standard lattice problems (such as approximating the length of the shortest nonzero vector to within certain polynomial factors). Our contributions include a new notion of trapdoor function with preimage sampling, simple and efficient "hashand-sign" digital signature schemes, and identity-based encryption.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the seminal work of Ajtai [3] connecting the average-case complexity of lattice problems to their complexity in the worst case, there has been an intriguing and fruitful effort to base cryptography (which requires security for random keys) on worst-case lattice assumptions. In addition to their unique theoretical niche, lattice-based schemes enjoy many potential advantages: their asymptotic efficiency and conceptual simplicity (usually requiring only linear operations on small integers); their resistance so far to cryptanalysis by quantum algorithms (as opposed to those based on factoring or discrete log); and the guarantee that their random instances are "as hard as possible."
Until very recently, the known constructions of such primitives were limited mainly to one-way and collision-resistant hash functions [3, 27, 17, 37, 40] and public-key encryption [5, 51, 52] . It has been a longstanding open problem to give a "direct" construction of digital signatures having the simplicity and efficiency of other lattice-based primitives, even in the random oracle model. 1 The early "GGH" signature proposal of Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Halevi [28] was directly related to a certain lattice problem, but it lacked a security proof, and recently, Nguyen and Regev [43] showed how to recover the entire secret key (or its equivalent) from a transcript of signatures.
Despite some recent advances in lattice-based cryptography (e.g., [49, 36] ), many important cryptographic notions (that were long ago attained under other number-theoretic assumptions) still remain unrealized under lattice assumptions.
Overview of Results and Techniques
Our main thesis in this work is that lattices admit natural and innate "trapdoors" that have a number of useful cryptographic applications. Going at least as far back as the GGH proposal, it was intuitively believed that a short basis of a lattice (i.e., a basis in which all the vectors are relatively short) could serve as such a trapdoor. Our central contribution is in showing how to use a short basis in a theoretically sound and secure way.
As a basic tool, we first construct a collection of trapdoor functions having some special properties. The functions are surjective and many-to-one, (i.e., every output value has sev-1 Indirect (but inefficient) constructions are of course possible by a generic transformation from universal one-way hash functions [42] , or (in the random oracle model) by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [24] to lattice-based identification schemes [41] . eral preimages), and the trapdoor inversion algorithm samples from among all the preimages under an appropriate distribution. Building upon this foundation, we then give direct lattice-based constructions of richer cryptographic notions, such as signature schemes and identity-based encryption.
A core component of all our constructions is an efficient algorithm that samples from a so-called discrete Gaussian probability distribution over an arbitrary lattice, given an appropriate basis. We believe that the sampling algorithm may have additional applications in complexity and cryptography.
Gaussian Sampling Algorithm
Because it is the foundation of our cryptographic results, we start by summarizing the Gaussian sampler. The distribution from which it samples is called a discrete Gaussian over an n-dimensional lattice Λ.
2 Under such a distribution DΛ,s,c, the probability of each vector v ∈ Λ is proportional to exp(−π v − c 2 /s 2 ), where c ∈ R n and s > 0 are parameters of the distribution akin to its mean and standard deviation, respectively. Discrete Gaussians over lattices are standard in mathematics (see, e.g., [8, 9] ), and have recently proved to be an exceedingly useful analytical tool in studying the computational complexity of lattice problems [1, 2, 45] , particularly their worst-case/average-case connections (e.g., [51, 40, 52] ).
The sampling algorithm takes as input the desired parameters c ∈ R n and s > 0, and an arbitrary basis B = {b1, . . . , bn} of the lattice Λ. The output is a lattice vector distributed according to DΛ,s,c, as long as the parameter s exceeds the length of all the Gram-Schmidt 3 vectorsbi of the basis B (times a small extra factor). In other words, the "width" of the sampled Gaussian is determined by the quality of the input basis. As an alternate perspective, one can view the sampler as a randomized decoder that outputs a lattice vector relatively close to c. A key property is that the output distribution depends only on the length of B's Gram-Schmidt vectors, and is otherwise oblivious to the particular geometry of the basis B.
The algorithm itself is actually a simple randomized variant of Babai's "nearest-plane" algorithm [7] , which was originally proposed by Klein [32] in another context. Instead of determinstically rounding to the nearest plane in each iteration, the algorithm simply chooses a plane with a probability determined by its distance from the target point. While the algorithm itself is not new, we present a (nearly) exact analysis of its output distribution using a lattice quantity called the smoothing parameter, as defined by Micciancio and Regev [40] . In the process, we also bound the smoothing parameter in terms of a quantity that we call the GramSchmidt minimum; this improves upon a prior bound involving the nth successive minimum [40] .
As an additional application, in the full version [26] we use the sampling algorithm to give conceptually simpler and slightly tighter worst-case to average-case reductions for lattice problems, building on prior Gaussian techniques [40] . 2 An n-dimensional lattice is the set of all integer linear combinations c1b1 + · · · + cnbn (where each ci ∈ Z) of some linearly independent basis vectors b1, . . . , bn ∈ R n . 3 The Gram-Schmidt vectors are defined iteratively: b1 = b1, andbi is the component of bi orthogonal to span(b1, . . . , bi−1) for i = 2, . . . , n. In particular, note that b i ≤ bi .
Cryptographic Constructions
Our cryptographic results are summarized as follows:
• We propose a new abstraction called trapdoor functions with preimage sampling, and present a construction whose security is based on the presumed worstcase hardness of standard lattice problems (and whose efficiency is comparable to prior lattice-based cryptographic functions).
• We show that our new abstraction can securely serve as a black-box replacement for trapdoor permutations in several prior signature schemes, including those that follow the "hash-and-sign" paradigm (in the random oracle model) [11, 12, 20] , and a construction of Bellare and Micali (in the plain model) [10] . In particular, we obtain simple and efficient "hash and sign" latticebased signatures, in the random oracle model.
• We construct an asymptotically efficient identity-based cryptosystem (in the random oracle model, or under an "interactive" assumption) based on learning with errors (LWE), a bounded-distance decoding problem on lattices that generalizes the well-known "learning parity under noise" problem. As shown by Regev [52] , the average-case hardness of LWE can be based on the presumed worst-case hardness of standard lattice problems for quantum algorithms.
• We present some trapdoor techniques for the LWE problem and cryptosystems based upon it. A concurrent work [48] applies these techniques to instantiate a general framework for efficient and universally composable oblivious transfer.
The worst-case problems underlying our schemes are to approximate the shortest independent vectors problem SIVP or the decision version of the shortest vector problem GapSVP to within small polynomial (in the dimension n) factors. Known classical (and quantum) algorithms for these problems require time and space that are exponential in n [6] , and known polynomial-time algorithms obtain approximation factors that are essentially exponential in n [33, 55] .
In all of our constructions, we need to generate a "hard" public basis B (chosen at random from some appropriate distribution) of some lattice Λ, together with a "good" trapdoor basis T of Λ whose Gram-Schmidt vectors are relatively short (this is used as advice for the sampling algorithm). Our preferred approach comes from a little-known paper of Ajtai [4] , who described a way to generate such bases so that the random public basis has worst-case hardness. As far as we know, our results are the first applications of Ajtai's generator in cryptography or otherwise.
Trapdoor functions with preimage sampling.
The basic object underlying our higher-level cryptographic tools is a collection of one-way (and even collision-resistant) trapdoor functions. Intuitively, evaluating a public function f = f B (where B is the public basis for Λ) on a random input corresponds to choosing a lattice point v ∈ Λ "uniformly at random" and perturbing it by some relatively short error term e, yielding a point y = v + e. 4 Inverting y corresponds to decoding it to any sufficiently nearby lattice point v ∈ Λ (not necessarily the original v; the error term is large enough that many preimages are possible). Given the trapdoor basis T, it is easy to decode y using the sampling algorithm. But given only the public basis B, the decoding problem is hard (on the average, for the particular distribution of B and y). Our trapdoor functions have two crucial properties for security in cryptographic applications. First, the random input (the error term e) is drawn from a relatively narrow Gaussian distribution, and under this distribution, the output y is statistically close to uniform over the range. Second, the trapdoor inversion algorithm does not just find an arbitrary preimage of y, but actually samples from among its preimages under the appropriate conditional distribution, i.e., a discrete Gaussian over Λ. In other words, the inverter samples an input e from the Gaussian input distribution, conditioned on the event f (e) = y.
The properties described above imply that there are two (nearly) equivalent ways of choosing a pair (e, y = f (e)): either choose e from the input distribution and compute y = f (e), or choose y uniformly at random and sample e from f −1 (y). As we shall see, these properties make our trapdoor functions "as good as" trapdoor permutations in certain applications.
Signature schemes.
The cryptographic literature contains several existentially unforgeable digital signature schemes based on trapdoor permutations. Using the "hash-and-sign paradigm" [22, 53] in the random oracle model, we have the simple and efficient full-domain hash (FDH) scheme [11] and its variants [12, 20] . In the plain model, there is a tree-based scheme of Bellare and Micali [10] that, while somewhat inefficient, has significantly shorter signatures than generic constructions based on one-way or universal one-way functions [42, 54] .
We show that all of the above permutation-based signature schemes can also be instantiated using (as a black box) any collection of trapdoor functions with preimage sampling, and retain their security analyses in their respective models (though subtleties can arise when signing the same message more than once). In fact, by relying on the collision resistance of our functions, we are able to give tight security reductions for FDH (and its variants), whereas reductions for plain FDH based on trapdoor permutations are inherently loose [20] . Using similar techniques, we also give a much tighter reduction for the scheme of Bellare and Micali.
Concretely, our hash-and-sign schemes represent a more theoretically sound way of instantiating the (insecure) GGH proposal [28] and its variants, such as NTRUSign [30] . Informally, in these schemes a message is hashed to a point in some region of space, and its signature is essentially a nearby lattice point, which is found using a "good" secret basis. Our schemes have two main differences: first, they are based on random lattices that enjoy worst-case hardness; second and more importantly, the signatures are generated by a randomized decoding algorithm whose output distribution is oblivious to the geometry of the secret basis. (The original GGH proposal is insecure precisely because its signatures leak information about the "shape" of the trapdoor basis [43] .) technique of reducing a random error term e modulo the public basis B.
Trapdoors for learning with errors.
Our next two applications are centered around the learning with errors (LWE) problem, as defined by Regev [52] . We observe that LWE is essentially a bounded-distance decoding problem on the dual lattice Λ * of Λ, where as above, Λ is a random lattice having public basis B (and trapdoor basis T). The goal of LWE is to decode a randomly-chosen lattice vector w ∈ Λ * that has been perturbed by some small amount of noise. The perturbation is small enough that w is indeed the vector in Λ * closest to the perturbed point p. In one version of Regev's LWE-based cryptosystem [52] , the same dual lattice Λ * is shared among all users, and public keys are perturbed points p as above. Security is demonstrated by showing that such public keys are indistinguishable from so-called "messy" public keys, whose ciphertexts carry no information about the encrypted messages. As in prior lattice-based cryptosystems [5, 51] , this is done using a non-constructive probabilistic argument.
A concurrent work of Peikert, Vaikuntanathan, and Waters [48] defines a general framework for efficient oblivious transfer, and instantiates it using cryptosystems that admit messy public keys. However, the framework requires a way to identify messy keys efficiently, given some master trapdoor for the cryptosystem. In this work, we give an explicit geometric description of messy keys in Regev's cryptosystem, and a way of efficiently identifying them. Essentially, a public key p is messy if the minimum distance of the dual lattice Λ * remains large after adjoining p to it. To identify such keys, we use the Gaussian sampling algorithm with the trapdoor basis T of Λ to implement the preprocessing phase of an algorithm of Aharonov and Regev [2] . Using an extension of this algorithm due to Liu, Lyubashevsky, and Micciancio [34] , we also show how to extract the secret key w ∈ Λ * from any properly-generated public key p, i.e., we show how to solve LWE using a master trapdoor.
(Due to space constraints, we omit the details of the techniques described above, and refer the interested reader to the full version [26] .)
Identity-based encryption.
In identity-based encryption (IBE), first envisioned by Shamir [56] , any string can serve as a public key, and secret keys are administered by an authority who knows some master secret key of the system. Thus far, IBE has been realized under various assumptions relating to groups with bilinear pairings (e.g., [14, 57] ), and under the quadratic residuosity (QR) assumption in the random oracle model or an "interactive" QR assumption in the plain model [18, 15] .
Our final application is an efficient IBE based on LWE in the random oracle model (or in the plain model under an interactive LWE assumption). Although secret keys can be extracted from public keys using a master trapdoor for Regev's cryptosystem, obtaining IBE is still not entirely straightforward. Essentially, the problem is that well-formed public keys are exponentially sparse, because they consist only of points that are very close to the shared lattice Λ * . Hence, it is difficult to see how a hash function or a random oracle could map identities to valid public keys.
We circumvent this problem by constructing a "dual" of Regev's public-key cryptosystem, in which the key generation and encryption algorithms are effectively swapped: public keys belong to the "primal" space containing Λ, and encryption is performed in the "dual" space containing Λ * .
In the resulting system, every point of the primal space is a valid public key having many equivalent secret keys, which are simply the nearby lattice points in Λ. Using the Gaussian decoder with the trapdoor basis T of Λ, the authority can extract a (properly-distributed) secret key from any public key. (In fact, extracting a secret key for an identity is entirely equivalent to signing that identity under our full-domain hash signature scheme.) Because it uses a trapdoor for extracting secret keys, our IBE is structurally closest to those based on quadratic residuosity [18, 15] . It is remarkably efficient, at least asymptotically: for messages of length n log n (where n is the security parameter), the amortized encryption and decryption times are onlyÕ(n) per message bit, and the ciphertext expansion factor can be made as small as O(1). One possible drawback of our system is that the master public key and individual secret keys areÕ(n 2 ) bits. As a point of comparison, the recent QR-based IBE of Boneh, Gentry, and Hamburg [15] has essentially optimal additive ciphertext expansion of O(n) bits (where n is the size of the master public modulus N = pq), but encryption and decryption time are O(n 4 ) and O(n 3 ) per message bit, respectively.
Related Work
The randomized nearest-plane algorithm we use for Gaussian sampling was originally proposed by Klein [32] for solving a variant of the closest vector problem, in which the target point is "unusually close" to the lattice. Klein's analysis is focused on the case where the parameter s is approximately the length of the shortest Gram-Schmidt vector of the input basis; for such parameters, the output distribution is concentrated on the unique closest lattice vector, but may be quite far from a discrete Gaussian. Recently, Nguyen and Vidick [44] showed that the output distribution is "quasiGaussian" when s is the length of the longest Gram-Schmidt vector; our analysis (nearly) subsumes theirs.
Independently of our work, Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [36] present a direct lattice-based construction of a onetime signature scheme that can sign O(n)-bit messages in onlyÕ(n) time. The efficiency of the scheme and its security proof are both based on special classes of so-called ideal lattices that have extra algebraic structure, studied in [38, 46, 35, 47] . A full signature scheme having comparable asymptotic efficiency is also obtained by incorporating the one-time scheme into a standard tree structure, though the signing algorithm must keep state proportional to the number of signed messages (barring a pseudorandom function of comparable efficiency).
Several works have given tight security reductions for FDHlike signatures based on variants of trapdoor permutations or specific number-theoretic assumptions. Coron [19] improved the exact security of FDH for its concrete instantiation with RSA. Dodis and Reyzin [23] presented tight reductions for probabilistic FDH (PFDH) based on any collection of clawfree pairs of trapdoor permutations. Katz and Wang [31] gave a tight reduction based on claw-free pairs for PFDH with only one bit of salt. Bernstein [13] recently gave a tight reduction for a concrete instantiation of FDH with RabinWilliams signatures. We remark that claw-free pairs can be viewed as a special case of collision-resistant trapdoor functions with preimage sampling from n+1 bits to n bits, where the extra input bit indicates which of the two permutations is evaluated on the remaining bits.
Using entirely different techniques, Peikert and Waters [49] have constructed a complementary collection of injective trapdoor functions based on LWE (among other assumptions). Their TDFs imply several cryptographic primitives, most notably chosen ciphertext-secure encryption, but have exponentially-sparse images that seem less well-suited toward applications like signature schemes and IBE. From a purely aesthetic point of view, our trapdoor functions also correspond more directly to "natural" lattice problems.
Open Problems
Many interesting questions arise from our work. The most important problem, in our view, is to construct a simple and efficient lattice-based signature scheme without using tree structures or a random oracle. Even under other strong number-theoretic assumptions, only a few such schemes are known (e.g., [25, 21] ), so this problem appears quite challenging. A related problem is to construct an IBE without a random oracle under standard lattice assumptions (recall that our IBE can be based on a non-standard "interactive" LWE assumption in the plain model).
Another important direction is to obtain more efficient cryptographic schemes based on ideal (e.g., cyclic) lattices, as in prior works [38, 46, 35, 47, 36] . Most of our techniques apply equally well to ideal lattices; two main technical hurdles are to generate appropriate random lattices with good trapdoor bases, and to demonstrate a hard decoding problem analogous to LWE.
The concrete security of our schemes (i.e., the approximation factor obtained by the worst-case/average-case reduction) is determined by the Gaussian parameter of the sampling algorithm, which in turn depends on the quality of the trapdoor basis. It is therefore important to optimize Ajtai's trapdoor generator [4] and its analysis, as well as to seek other Gaussian sampling algorithms that might work for smaller parameters s (perhaps given different advice).
A final interesting problem is to construct a lattice-based IBE having security under chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA security). The techniques of [49] for obtaining CCA security in lattice-based public-key cryptosystems are quite different from ours, and do not appear to be immediately applicable to our IBE. Combining the two approaches seems to be a worthy goal.
PRELIMINARIES
For a positive integer n, [n] denotes {1, . . . , n}. The natural security parameter throughout the paper is n, and all other quantities are implicitly functions of n. We extend any real function f (·) to a countable set A by defining f (A) = P x∈A f (x). By convention, vectors are in column form and are written using bold lower-case letters, e.g. x. The ith component of x will be denoted by xi. Matrices are written as bold capital letters, e.g. X, and the ith column vector of a matrix X is denoted xi. The length of a matrix is the norm of its longest column: X = maxi xi . For convenience, we sometimes view a matrix as simply the set of its column vectors.
The statistical distance between two distributions X and Y over a countable domain D is defined to be
We say that two distributions (formally, two ensembles of distributions indexed by n) are statistically close if their statistical distance is negligible in n.
For signature schemes, we use the standard notion of strong existential unforgeability under chosen-message attack [29] . For identity-based encryption (IBE), we use the standard definition of security under a chosen-plaintext and chosen-identity attack [14] . In brief, an adversary is given access to an oracle that returns secret keys for any input identity, and attempts to distinguish between encryptions of two messages of its choice, encrypted under an identity of its choice (for which it may not query the oracle).
Lattices
Let B = {b1, . . . , bn} ⊂ R n consist of n linearly independent vectors. The n-dimensional lattice 5 Λ generated by the basis B is
The minimum distance λ1(Λ) of a lattice Λ is the length (in the Euclidean 2 norm, unless otherwise indicated) of its shortest nonzero vector: λ1(Λ) = min 0 =x∈Λ x . More generally, the ith successive minimum λi(Λ) is the smallest radius r such that Λ contains i linearly independent vectors of norm at most r. We write λ ∞ 1 to denote the minimum distance measured in the ∞ norm (which is defined as x ∞ = max |xi|).
A lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of R n . Therefore for lattices Λ ⊆ Λ, the quotient group Λ/Λ (also written Λ mod Λ ) is well-defined as the additive group of distinct cosets v + Λ for v ∈ Λ, with addition of cosets defined in the usual way.
For any (ordered) set S = {s1, . . . , sn} ⊂ R n of linearly independent vectors, letS = {s1, . . . ,sn} denote its GramSchmidt orthogonalization, defined iteratively in the following way:s1 = s1, and for each i = 2, . . . , n,si is the component of si orthogonal to span(s1, . . . , si−1). Clearly, s i ≤ si . The following useful lemma says that any fullrank set of vectors in a lattice can be efficiently converted to a basis of the lattice, without increasing the lengths of the Gram-Schmidt vectors.
Lemma 2.1 ([39, Lemma 7.1, page 129]). There is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that, given an arbitrary basis B of an n-dimensional lattice Λ = L(B) and a full-rank set of lattice vectors S ⊂ Λ (in non-decreasing order by length), outputs a basis T of Λ such that
The dual lattice of Λ, denoted Λ * , is defined to be Λ * = {x ∈ R n : ∀ v ∈ Λ, x, v ∈ Z}. By symmetry, it can be seen that (Λ * ) * = Λ. If B is a basis of Λ, it can be seen that the dual basis B * = (B −1 ) T is in fact a basis of Λ * . The following standard fact relates the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalizations of a basis and its dual (a proof can be found in [50, Lecture 8] ).
Lemma 2.2. Let {b1, . . . , bn} be an (ordered) basis, and let the ordered basis {dn, . . . , d1} be its dual in reversed order (i.e., di = b * n−i+1 ). Thendi =bi/ b i 2 for all i ∈ [n]. 5 Technically, this is the definition of a full-rank lattice, which is all we will be concerned with in this work.
For completeness, we recall two standard worst-case approximation problems on lattices. In both problems, γ = γ(n) is the approximation factor. Definition 1. An input to the shortest (nonzero) vector problem GapSVP γ is a basis B of a full-rank n-dimensional lattice. It is a YES instance if λ1(L(B)) ≤ 1, and is a NO instance if λ1(L(B)) > γ(n).
Definition 2. An input to the shortest independent vectors problem SIVPγ is a full-rank basis B of an n-dimensional lattice. The goal is to output a set of n linearly independent lattice vectors S ⊂ L(B) such that S ≤ γ(n) · λn(L(B)).
Gaussians on Lattices
Our review of Gaussian measures over lattices follows the development by prior works [51, 2, 40 ]. For any s > 0 define the Gaussian function on R n centered at c with parameter s:
The subscripts s and c are taken to be 1 and 0 (respectively) when omitted. For any c ∈ R n , real s > 0, and n-dimensional lattice Λ, define the discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ as:
∀x ∈ Λ, DΛ,s,c(x) = ρs,c(x) ρs,c(Λ) .
(As above, we may omit the parameters s or c.) Note that the denominator in the above expression is merely a normalization factor; the probability DΛ,s,c(x) is simply proportional to ρs,c(x). Micciancio and Regev [40] proposed a lattice quantity called the smoothing parameter : Definition 3. For any n-dimensional lattice Λ and positive real > 0, the smoothing parameter η (Λ) is the smallest real s > 0 such that ρ 1/s (Λ * \{0}) ≤ .
In this paper we use two bounds on the smoothing parameter. The first relates the smoothing parameter of a lattice to the minimum distance of its dual lattice, in the ∞ norm.
Lemma 2.3 ([45]
). For any n-dimensional lattice Λ and real > 0, we have
.
Then for any ω(
The second bound on the smoothing parameter relates the smoothing parameter to the longest Gram-Schmidt vector in any basis of the lattice; see Section 3.
We now state some facts regarding discrete Gaussians that apply when the parameter s exceeds the smoothing parameter of the lattice.
Lemma 2.4 ([40]
). Let Λ be any n-dimensional lattice. Then for any ∈ (0, 1), s ≥ η (Λ), and c ∈ R n , we have ρs,c(Λ) ∈ [
1− 1+
, 1] · ρs(Λ).
Lemma 2.5 ([40, Lemma 4.4]).
For any n-dimensional lattice Λ, c ∈ span(Λ), real ∈ (0, 1), and s ≥ η (Λ),
Lemma 2.6 ([46]
). For any n-dimensional lattice Λ, c ∈ R n , > 0, s ≥ 2η (Λ), and x ∈ Λ, we have
Then for < 1 3 , the min-entropy of DΛ,s,c is at least n − 1.
Learning with Errors
We now review the learning with errors problem [52] . For any α > 0, the continuous Gaussian distribution Dα has density function exp(−πx 2 /α 2 )/α for all x ∈ R. For a positive integer q, defineΨα to be the distribution on Zq obtained by taking a sample from Dq·α, rounding to the nearest integer, and reducing modulo q.
For an integer q ≥ 2 and some error distribution χ over Zq, a positive dimension n ∈ Z, and a vector s ∈ Z n q , As,χ is the distribution on Z n q × Zq of the variable (a, a T s + x) where a ← Z n q is uniformly random and x ← χ are independent, and all operations are performed in Zq. The goal of the (average-case) learning with errors problem LWEq,χ is to distinguish (with nonnegligible probability) between the distribution As,χ for some uniform (secret) s ← Z n q and the uniform distribution on Z n q × Zq, via oracle access to the given distribution.
Regev proved that for certain moduli q and error distributions χ, LWEq,χ is as hard as approximating standard lattice problems in the worst case, using a quantum algorithm.
Proposition 2.7 ([52]
). Let α = α(n) ∈ (0, 1) and let q = q(n) be a prime such that q · α > 2 √ n. If there exists an efficient (possibly quantum) algorithm that solves LWE q,Ψα , then there exists an efficient quantum algorithm for approximating SIVP and GapSVP in the worst case to withinÕ(n/α) factors.
SMOOTHING PARAMETER BOUND
Here we give a new bound on the smoothing parameter relative to a certain lattice quantity. For a lattice Λ, define the Gram-Schmidt minimum as
where the minimum is taken over all (ordered) bases B of Λ. (This definition is equivalent to one given by Cai [16] .) The definition is restricted to bases without loss of generality, because Lemma 2.1 implies that for any full-rank set S ⊂ Λ, there is a basis T of Λ such that T ≤ S ≤ S . Lemma 3.1. For any n-dimensional lattice Λ and real > 0, we have
Then for any ω( √ log n) function, there is a negligible (n) for which η (Λ) ≤bl(Λ) · ω( √ log n).
Lemma 3.2. For any n-dimensional lattice Λ,
Furthermore, the latter inequality is tight up to some constant factor, i.e., there exists a family of lattices {Λn} n∈N such that Λn is an n-dimensional lattice and λn(Λn) ≥ Ω( √ n)· bl(Λn).
In particular, becausebl(Λ) ≤ λn(Λ) by Lemma 3.2, the bound from Lemma 3.1 on the smoothing parameter is at least as strong as a prior one relating it to λn [40, Lemma 3.3] (and by the last part of Lemma 3.2, the new bound can be up to an Ω( √ n) factor tighter). We now prove Lemma 3.1; the proof of Lemma 3.2 is rather routine, so we defer it to the full version [26] .
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Let B be a basis of Λ such that B =bl(Λ). By applying rigid rotations and reflections to the lattice Λ (resulting in corresponding transformations of the dual lattice Λ * ), we may assume without loss of generality that the orthogonal Gram-Schmidt vectorsbi are parallel to the standard basis vectors ei ∈ R n (respectively). This transformation does not affect the value of the smoothing parameter η (Λ), because it is defined with respect to the Gaussian measure ρ 1/s (Λ * \{0}), which is invariant under rotations and reflections.
By Lemma 2.3, it suffices to show that λ ∞ 1 (Λ * ) ≥ 1/bl(Λ). Let {dn, . . . , d1} be the dual basis of B in reversed order, i.e., di = b * n−i+1 . By Lemma 2.2, we see that for all i ∈ [n], the Gram-Schmidt vectordi = en−i+1/ b i . Now let v ∈ Λ * be an arbitrary nonzero dual lattice vector. We have v = cndn +· · · c1d1 for some integer coefficients ci that are not all zero; let i ∈ [n] be the smallest index such that ci is nonzero. Because
SAMPLING DISCRETE GAUSSIANS
Here we show how to use an arbitrary basis B to sample efficiently from the discrete Gaussian distribution DΛ,s,c, for any s greater than B (times a small factor). In particular, it suffices to have an appropriately short full-rank set of lattice vectors S ⊂ Λ, because by Lemma 2.1 we can efficiently convert it into a basis B such that B ≤ S ≤ S .
As a first attempt, consider an algorithm that first samples from a continuous Gaussian with parameter s, and then uses B to "round off" the sampled point to a relatively nearby lattice point. In fact, Regev applied this exact strategy in the "bootstrapping" step of his reduction [52] , using an LLL-reduced basis and a Gaussian parameter s that was an exponential factor larger than the basis length B . Unfortunately, this strategy does not work so well when s is a small multiple of the basis length. Even when Λ is a onedimensional lattice, e.g., the set of integers Z ⊂ R 1 , the statistical distance between the discrete Gaussian and the distribution induced by the rounding scheme is non-negligible.
Instead of using continuous distributions, we show how to sample "directly" from a lattice under the desired discrete Gaussian distribution. Even in the one-dimensional case, this requires some care: the support of the distribution is infinite, and even a close approximation to it may not have a succinct representation (e.g., when the parameter s is large).
Theorem 4.1. There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that, given a basis B of an n-dimensional lattice Λ = L(B), a parameter s ≥ B · ω( √ log n), and a center c ∈ R n , outputs a sample from a distribution that is statistically close to DΛ,s,c.
We first define the subroutine SampleZ, which samples from the discrete Gaussian D Z,s,c over the one-dimensional integer lattice Z. Let t(n) ≥ ω( √ log n) be some fixed function, say, t(n) = log n. SampleZ uses rejection sampling, and works as follows: on input (s, c) and (implicitly) the security parameter n, choose an integer x ← Z . = Z∩[c−s·t(n), c+s· t(n)] uniformly at random. Then with probability ρs(x−c) ∈ (0, 1], output x, otherwise repeat. For lack of space, we defer the proof of the following lemma to the full version [26] .
Lemma 4.2. For any 0 < < exp(−π), any s ≥ η (Z) and c ∈ R, and any ω(log n) function, SampleZ terminates within t(n) · ω(log n) iterations with overwhelming probability, and its output distribution is statistically close to D Z,s,c .
We now describe a randomized nearest-plane algorithm, called SampleD, that samples from a discrete Gaussian DΛ,s,c over any lattice Λ. The input to SampleD is an (ordered) basis B of an n-dimensional lattice Λ, a parameter s > 0, and a center c ∈ R n . We describe the algorithm as if it has access to an oracle that samples exactly from D Z,s ,c for any desired s > 0 and c ∈ R. SampleD proceeds as follows:
1. Let vn ← 0 and cn ← c. For i ← n, . . . , 1, do:
this is the only step that differs from the nearest-plane algorithm).
(c) Let ci−1 ← ci − zibi and let vi−1 ← vi + zibi.
Output v0.
Assuming scalar operations take unit time, the running time of the algorithm is O(n 2 ) plus the running time of the n oracle calls. By construction, the output of SampleD is always a lattice vector.
Due to lack of space, we must defer the full proof of Theorem 4.1 to the full version. The main idea is that the output probability of each lattice vector v ∈ L(B) is ρs,c(v)/ Q i ρ s i ,c i (Z). Because s i ≥ ω( √ log n) exceeds the smoothing parameter of Z, the terms in the denominator are essentially independent of the c i variables. It follows that the denominator is essentially the same quantity for all v ∈ L(B), and the probability of outputting v is proportional to ρs,c(v), as desired.
TRAPDOORS FOR HARD LATTICES

Hard Random Lattices
We start by describing a certain family of "random" lattices that, roughly speaking, enjoy worst-case hardness. Let A ∈ Z n×m q for some positive integers n, m, q. In this work (as in prior ones), n is the natural security parameter and all other variables are functions of n; for example, m = m(n) is typically O(n log n), and the modulus q = q(n) is some small polynomial, e.g., O(n 3 ). Define the full-rank m-dimensional integer lattice consisting of those integer vectors that are "orthogonal" (modulo q) to the rows of A:
In the terminology of coding theory, A is the "parity check" matrix for the lattice Λ ⊥ (A). When A is implicit from context, we sometimes omit it and just write Λ
⊥ .
An important fact we use throughout this section is that the quotient group (Z m /Λ ⊥ ) and the set of syndromes {u = Ae mod q : e ∈ Z m } ⊆ Z n q are in bijective correspondence, via the mapping (e+Λ ⊥ ) → Ae mod q. In other words, computing the syndrome Ae mod q for some e ∈ Z m is equivalent to reducing e modulo the lattice Λ ⊥ (A). We now assert a few important facts about these random lattices that will be used in this section. The proofs are deferred to the full version [26] .
Proposition 5.1. Let n and q be positive integers with q prime, and let m ≥ 2n lg q. Then for all but a 2q −n fraction of all A ∈ Z n×m q and for any s ≥ ω( √ log m), we have:
1. The subset-sums of the columns of A generate Z n q ; i.e., for every syndrome u ∈ Z n q there is an e ∈ {0, 1} m such that Ae = u mod q.
2. For e ∼ D Z m ,s , the distribution of the syndrome u = Ae mod q is statistically close to uniform over Z n q .
3. For fixed u ∈ Z n q and an arbitrary solution t ∈ Z m to At = u mod q, the conditional distribution of e ∼ D Z m ,s given Ae = u mod q is exactly t + D Λ ⊥ ,s,−t .
The following problem is related to the shortest vector problem on the family of lattices defined above. , and a real β, find an nonzero integer vector e ∈ Λ ⊥ (A) such that e 2 ≤ β. For functions q(n), m(n), and β(n), SIS q,m,β is the ensemble over instances (q(n), A, β(n)) where A ∈ Z n×m(n) q is uniformly random.
By a pigeonhole argument on the values Ae mod q for e ∈ {0, 1} m , one can show that SIS always admits a solution in {0, ±1} m for m ≥ 2n lg q, so we may take β ≥ √ m. From now on, m and β will always satisfy these contraints.
Ajtai [3] first showed that solving SIS q,m,β (on the average) is as hard as approximating certain problems (e.g., SIVP and GapSVP) on any lattice of dimension n to within poly(n) factors. Using Gaussian techniques, Micciancio and Regev [40] improved the approximation factors to as small as O(n). In the full version [26] , we give a simpler and slightly tighter proof of this fact that employs our discrete Gaussian sampling algorithm, and which works for smaller q.
Proposition 5.2. For any poly-bounded m, β = poly(n) and for any prime q ≥ β · ω( √ n log n), the average-case problem SIS q,m,β is as hard as approximating the SIVP problem (among others) in the worst case to within certain γ = β ·Õ( √ n) factors.
Trapdoor Functions
A collection of trapdoor collision-resistant hash functions with preimage sampling is given by probabilistic polynomialtime algorithms (TrapGen, SampleDom, SamplePre) that satisfy the following:
1. Generating a function with trapdoor : TrapGen(1 n ) outputs (a, t), where a is the description of an efficientlycomputable function fa : Dn → Rn (for some efficientlyrecognizable domain Dn and range Rn depending on n), and t is some trapdoor information for fa.
For the remainder, fix some (a, t) ← TrapGen(1 n ).
2. Domain sampling and uniform output: SampleDom(1 n ) samples an x from some (possibly non-uniform) distribution over Dn, for which the distribution of fa(x) is uniform over Rn.
3. Preimage sampling with trapdoor : for every y ∈ Rn, SamplePre(t, y) samples from the conditional distribution of x ← SampleDom(1 n ), given fa(x) = y.
4. Preimage min-entropy: for every y ∈ Rn, the conditional min-entropy of x ← SampleDom(1 n ) given fa(x) = y is at least ω(log n). (In fact, one bit of min-entropy suffices for many applications.)
5. Collision-resistance without trapdoor : for any probabilistic poly-time algorithm A, the probability that A(1 n , a) outputs distinct x, x ∈ Dn such that fa(x) = fa(x ) is negligible, where the probability is taken over the choice of a and A's random coins.
To be completely precise, the trapdoor functions we construct will only satisfy the above properties statistically, i.e., with overwhelming probability over the choice of a and the randomness of SampleDom, etc. None of these relaxations will affect security in our applications.
We now recall the result of Ajtai [4] that shows how to sample an essentially uniform A ∈ Z n×m q , along with a relatively short full-rank "trapdoor" set of lattice vectors S ⊂ Λ ⊥ (A).
Proposition 5.3 ([4]).
For any prime q = poly(n) and any m ≥ 5n lg q, there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that, on input 1 n , outputs a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and a full-rank set S ⊂ Λ ⊥ (A), where the distribution of A is statistically close to uniform over Z n×m q and S ≤ L = m 2.5 . By Lemma 2.1, the set S can be converted efficiently to a "good" basis T of
By optimizing Ajtai's construction and its analysis, the bound L on the length S of the short set can be improved to L = m 1+ for any > 0; we defer the details. We can now define a collection of trapdoor functions with preimage sampling based on the average-case hardness of SIS. Let q, m, and L be as in Proposition 5.3. The collection is parameterized by some Gaussian parameter s ≥ L · ω( √ log m).
• The function generator uses the algorithm from Proposition 5.3 to choose (A, T), where A ∈ Z n×m q is statistically close to uniform and T ⊂ Λ ⊥ (A) is a good basis with T ≤ L. The matrix A (and q) defines the function f A (·), and the good basis T is its trapdoor.
• The function f A is defined as f A (e) = Ae mod q, with domain Dn = {e ∈ Z m : e ≤ s √ m} and range Rn = Z n q . The input distribution is D Z m ,s , sampled using SampleD with the standard basis for Z m .
• The trapdoor inversion algorithm on (A, T, s, u) samples from f −1
A (u) as follows: first, choose via linear algebra an arbitrary t ∈ Z m such that At = u mod q (such a t exists for all but an at most q −n fraction of A, by Proposition 5.1). Then sample v ∼ D Λ ⊥ ,s,−t using SampleD(T, s, −t), and output e = t + v.
We stress that it is important to sample the input from the discrete Gaussian D Z m ,s , rather than (say) sampling from a continuous Gaussian over R m (with parameter s) and rounding off each coordinate to the nearest integer. The reason is that the inversion algorithm samples a preimage from the former distribution (conditioned on a particular output), and the latter distribution differs from the former by nonnegligible statistical distance (see the discussion at the beginning of Section 4). Proof. First we note that s ≥ L · ω(
We start with domain sampling. A sample e ∼ D Z m ,s lands in the domain Dn (except with exponentially small probability) by Lemma 2.5. Furthermore, for an overwhelming fraction of A, f A (e) is statistically close to uniform over Rn by Corollary 5.1.
We now show preimage sampling. Because s ≥ T · ω( √ log m), Theorem 4.1 implies that SampleD samples from a distribution that is statistically close to D Λ ⊥ ,s,−t . Then by Proposition 5.1, the inverter samples from the appropriate conditional distribution. It also follows immediately by Lemma 2.6 that the preimage min-entropy is at least m − 1.
Finally, for collision resistance, a collision e, e ∈ Dn for f A implies A(e − e ) = 0 mod q. Because e − e ≤ 2s √ m by the triangle inequality and e − e = 0 because e, e are distinct, finding a collision in a random f A implies solving SIS q,m,2s √ m .
SIGNATURE SCHEMES
Here we show that "hash-and-sign" signature schemes originally defined for collections of trapdoor permutations can also be instantiated securely using our notion of trapdoor functions with preimage sampling. In fact, we are even able to give a tight security reduction for the full-domain hash scheme (FDH) by exploiting collision resistance. This stands in constrast to the best known reductions for FDH using trapdoor permutations: for trapdoor permutations treated as a black-box, the reduction must lose a factor of Q hash [23] ; for RSA and claw-free permutations, the known reductions still lose a factor of Qsign [19, 23] ). In addition, all of our instantiations are strongly unforgeable.
In this extended abstract, we restrict our attention to an instantiation of FDH. In the full version [26] , we analyze probabilistic variants of FDH and a variant of the BellareMicali scheme [10] in the plain model.
For security, the signer must give out at most one distinct signature for each message. This can be implemented by making the signer stateful, or by using a pseudorandom function (e.g., the random oracle itself) to implement "repeatable randomness" in a standard way. For simplicity, we describe the stateful version of the scheme. It uses (as a black-box) a collection of trapdoor collision-resistant hash functions with preimage sampling given by TrapGen, SampleDom, SamplePre, and operates relative to a function H = Hn : {0, 1} * → Rn that is modelled as a random oracle. Recall that Dn and Rn are the efficiently-recognizable domain and range, respectively, of the trapdoor collection for security parameter n.
• SigKeyGen(1 n ): let (a, t) ← TrapGen(1 n ), where a describes a function fa and t is its trapdoor. The verification key is a and the signing key is t.
• Sign(t, m): if (m, σm) is in local storage, output σm.
Else, let σm ← SamplePre(t, H(m)), store (m, σm), and output σm.
• Verify(a, m, σ): if σ ∈ Dn and fa(σ) = H(m), accept. Else, reject.
Proposition 6.1. The scheme described above is strongly existentially unforgeable under a chosen-message attack.
Proof. It is clear that the scheme is complete, by the properties of the trapdoor collection.
Assume, for contradiction, that there is an adversary A that breaks the existential unforgeability of the signature scheme with probability = (n). We construct a poly-time adversary S that breaks the trapdoor collision-resistant hash function with probability negligibly close to . Given an index a describing a function fa, S runs A on public key a, and simulates the random oracle H and signing oracle as follows. Without loss of generality, assume that A queries H on every message m before making a signing query on m.
• For every query to H on a distinct m ∈ {0, 1} * , S lets σm ← SampleDom(1 n ), stores (m, σm), and returns fa(σm) to A. (If H was previously queried on m, S looks up (m, σm) and returns fa(σm).)
• Whenever A makes a signing query on m, S looks up (m, σm) in its local storage and returns σm.
Without loss of generality, assume that before outputting its attempted forgery (m * , σ * ), A queries H on m * . When A produces (m * , σ * ), S looks up (m * , σm * ) in its local storage and outputs (σ * , σm * ) as a collision in fa. In the full version [26] , we rigorously analyze the reduction and show that S outputs a collision with probability negligibly close to (n). Essentially, the properties of the trapdoor family ensure that the view provided by S to A is statistically close to that of the real chosen-message attack. Furthermore, if A produces a valid forgery (m * , σ * ), then fa(σ * ) = H(m * ) = fa(σm * ) and σ * = σm * with overwhelming probability, so σ * , σm * is a collision in fa.
IDENTITY-BASED ENCRYPTION
Here we construct an identity-based encryption (IBE) system based on the LWE problem in the random oracle model, or under an "interactive" assumption on LWE in the plain model. The IBE scheme follows from two steps. The first is a public-key cryptosystem with "dense" public keys; namely, every syndrome in Z n q is a valid public key having many essentially equivalent secret keys. (This cryptosystem is essentially the "dual" of Regev's [52] .) The second component is a way to extract a properly-distributed secret key from any public key, using a master trapdoor.
For simplicity, we describe a single-bit public-key cryptosystem, which operates in the following setting. An index A ∈ Z n×m q for the function f A (e) = Ae mod q is chosen uniformly at random and shared by all users. A user's secret key is an e ∈ Z m chosen from D Z m ,s (the input distribution for f A ), and the user's public key is the syndrome u = f A (e). The encryption and decryption algorithm work as follows, where χ is the error distribution for the LWE problem:
• Enc(u, b): to encrypt a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, choose s ← Z • Dec(e, (p, c)): compute b = c − e T p ∈ Zq. Output 0 if b is closer to 0 than to q/2 modulo q, otherwise output 1.
In the IBE, the authority chooses the master public key A together with a trapdoor basis T (the master secret key) as described in Proposition 5.3. A hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z n q maps identities to public keys. To encrypt to an identity id, simply encrypt to the public key u = H(id) using the above system. To extract a secret key for identity id, the authority uses the trapdoor T to sample a secret key e ← f
−1
A (H(id)). The authority should either be stateful or use a pseudorandom function in a standard way, so that the same secret key is always returned for the same identity (as in the FDH signature scheme of Section 6). A proof of the following theorem is given in the full version [26] .
Theorem 7.1. Let parameters q ≥ 5(m+1)L·ω( √ log m) and m satisfy the hypotheses of Proposition 5.3, and let the error distribution χ =Ψα for α ≤ 1/(L √ m + 1 · ω(log m)). Then the above cryptosystem and IBE are correct (with overwhelming probability), CPA-secure, and anonymous, assuming that LWEq,χ is hard and H is modelled as a random oracle.
The cryptosystem and IBE can easily be extended to encrypt messages of length k = poly(n) bits, with ciphertexts ofÕ(m + k) bits and public keys of sizeÕ(kn) bits. The idea is to include k independent syndromes u1, . . . , u k in the public key, and to encrypt to each of them using the same random s ∈ Z n q and independent error terms xi ← χ. (This technique is similar to an amortized construction from [48] for Regev's original system, and to the IBE from [15] ). For k = Ω(m), this yields amortized encryption and decryption time ofÕ(n) per message bit, and a ciphertext expansion factor of O(log n). It is also possible to encrypt Ω(log n) bits per syndrome under essentially the same assumption on LWE, which yields a ciphertext expansion factor of O(1).
Finally, we remark that instead of modelling H as a random oracle, we can also construct an IBE and prove its security under an "interactive" assumption about the hardness of LWE in the presence of a (stateful) oracle that returns a sample from f −1
A (H(id)) for arbitrary id queries. (A similar assumption on quadratic residuosity was used for the IBE of [15] .) The full description and proof are given in the full version [26] .
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